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Abstract: 
Although the literature on the political economy of public finance is already quite 
extensive, most articles analyse the behaviour of central governments. 
Furthermore, studies about the Portuguese economy are scarce. The present article 
contributes for a better understanding of these phenomena by testing the influence 
of political factors on municipal expenditure decisions in Portugal. The dataset 
used in the empirical work has information for all mainland Portuguese 
municipalities from 1979 to 2000. The tests performed reveal that local politicians 
increase capital expenditures before elections, particularly on roads and streets 
construction. Results also indicate that when the mayor belongs to the party that 
dominates the municipal assembly capital expenditures are higher. Finally, no 
support was found for partisan effects on incumbents’ investment expenditures 
choices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a growing body of literature analysed the impact of political motives 
on economic policy decisions, particularly on fiscal policy. Although the international 
research on this topic is already quite extensive,1 most papers analyse the behaviour of 
central governments and very few focus on local authorities. Furthermore, the number 
of studies investigating the Portuguese case, both at the central or local governments, is 
extremely small. The present research contributes for a better understanding of these 
phenomena in Portugal. It studies the impact of political factors on capital expenditure 
decisions in a sample composed of all mainland Portuguese municipalities, over a 
twenty two year period (from 1979 to 2000) 
This article reveals that local politicians increase capital expenditures before 
elections, particularly on items highly visible to the electorate such as streets and roads 
construction. This behaviour is in accordance with the rational opportunistic theory, 
which predicts that incumbents increase public expenditures before elections in order to 
appear more competent, and improve their chances of winning the election. Evidence 
also suggests that the size of the opportunistic cycle does not depend on whether the 
mayor’s political party has a majority in the local assembly. Political cohesion is, 
however, positively associated with the amount of capital expenditures spent in the 
municipalities. Regarding partisan theory, the tests performed reveal that the mayor’s 
ideology does not determine the type of privileged investments. 
The next section briefly reviews the literature on the political economy of public 
finance. Section 3 presents a short digression on municipalities in Portugal, while 
section 4 describes the dataset. The empirical strategy used to investigate the impact of 
elections on municipal expenditures is explained in section 5 and the results obtained 
are present in section 6. Finally, conclusions are reported.  
 
2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
In the seventies, two seminal contributions, Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977), 
initiated the literature on political business cycles2 (PBC). Nordhaus (1975) presented a 
model of opportunistic incumbents that manipulate the economy before elections in 
order to appear more competent and increase their probability of re-election. The model 
                                                 
1 See Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1997), Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) for 
comprehensive discussions on this topic. 
2 For extensive revisions on the topic see Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1997) and Price (1997). 
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assumes that voters’ expectations are formed adaptively and that incumbent politicians 
are able to control fiscal and monetary policy in a way that permits them to realize their 
preferred combination of inflation and unemployment. Therefore, before elections, 
incumbents generate an inflation surprise to decrease the unemployment rate and secure 
a higher number of votes. Hibbs (1977) introduced the first partisan model. Shortly, it 
predicts that once in power, politicians try to favour the groups of the population by 
which they were elected. Parties have, therefore, different objectives for economic 
variables. In particular, Hibbs admits that left wing parties are supported by the lower 
classes of society, who suffer the most with unemployment increases, and consequently, 
when elected, they are mainly concerned with reducing unemployment. On the other 
hand, right wing parties obtain most of their votes from the upper classes of the 
population, who dislike inflation more than unemployment. When in office they 
therefore focus on price stabilization. As in Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977) admits a 
short-run Phillips curve exploitable through monetary and fiscal policy. 
The rational expectations revolution led to reformulations of the first generation 
of PBC models. The idea that incumbents could systematically manipulate real 
economic variables through pre-election demand shocks became untenable. The 
introduction of rational expectations in the models gave birth to a second wave of 
contributions. Alesina (1987) presented the first rational partisan model. According to 
Alesina (1987) the existence of uncertainty regarding the ideology of the party that will 
win an election may cause inflation prediction errors for the period immediately after 
the balloting.3 This makes it possible for governments to cause short run deviations in 
real economic variables from their natural rates immediately after elections. Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Person and Tabellini 
(1990) developed opportunistic models with rational expectations. According to them, 
governments are opportunistic but differ in their level of competence, which they know 
before the electorate. Therefore, before elections, incumbents have an incentive to take 
advantage of this asymmetry of information by manipulating economic policy variables 
in order to appear the more competent possible.  
Since fiscal policy is, for most voters, an obscure subject, it is very attractive for 
manipulation by opportunistic governments. Opportunistic behaviour leads to an 
                                                 
3 Following Hibbs (1977), Alesina (1987) assumes that parties’ ideology conditions their 
inflation preferences. Right wing parties prefer lower inflation rates than left wing parties. 
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increase in public expenditures or a reduction of taxes before elections to transmit the 
idea that incumbents are doing a good job with public financial accounts. The higher the 
quantity of public goods/services a government can offer for a given amount of public 
revenue, the more competent it is. 
Three main results emerge from the international literature testing political 
business cycles on central governments. First, most authors find evidence in favour of 
partisan theory, with stronger support for rational models. Second, partisan effects are 
stronger in countries with stable governments and clear ideological differences among 
competing parties. Third, evidence in favour of opportunistic business cycles is weak.  
Recently, a growing body of literature has investigated the impact of other 
political factors on public finance. Issues such as the use of debt as a strategic variable 
(Person and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), the influence of budgetary 
institutions (Alesina and Perotti, 1996), the effect of conflicts among parties forming 
governmental coalitions (Roubini and Sachs, 1989), and the impact of “wars of 
attrition” between groups with conflicting objectives on the timing of fiscal 
stabilizations (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) have been addressed.4 Despite the extensive 
number of empirical studies using cross-country data to investigate central 
governments’ fiscal policy decisions, the number of publications performing similar 
analysis for state or local governments within countries other than the U.S. and 
Germany is quite scarce.5   
The Portuguese reality is under researched both at the national and sub-national 
levels.6 The present work intends to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the 
influence of political factors on Portuguese local governments’ expenditure decisions. 
Portuguese Municipalities are used as laboratory.  
 
 
                                                 
4 See chapter 9 in Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1997), Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini 
(2002) for comprehensive discussions on these topics. 
5 For the U.S. state and local governments see Gramlich (1991), Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba 
(1994), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Bohn and Inman (1996) and Sørensen, Wu and Yosha 
(2001). For the German Länders see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). For the Russian 
regions see Akhemedov, Ravichev and Zhuravskaya (2002), for Canadian provincial 
governments see Blais and Nadeau (1992), and for Israel see Rosenberg (1992). 
6 There are only two studies analyzing Portuguese local governments. Baleiras and Costa (2001) 
work with a sample of thirty Portuguese mainland municipalities, from 1977 to 1993. Marta 
(2000) investigates municipalities from the Northern region of Portugal. 
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3. MUNICIPALITIES IN PORTUGAL 
This section presents some background information on institutional and public 
finance rules in Portuguese Municipalities. Democracy was re-established in Portugal in 
April 25, 1974 after 48 years of dictatorship.7 Portuguese municipalities were formally 
established in the 1976 Constitution and the first municipal elections took place in 
December 1976. In mainland Portugal there are currently 278 municipalities.  
Local governments are concerned with improving the well-being of the 
population that live in their territories. They promote social and economic development, 
territory organization, and supply local public goods (water and sewage, transports, 
housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports, defence of the environment and 
protection of the civil population).8  
There are no disparities in budgeting rules and institutions among Portuguese 
mainland municipalities,9 although the law regulating local public finances changed 
during the period considered.10 Municipalities are financially autonomous. They have 
their own employees and patrimony. Each year the executive organ of the municipality 
(town council) proposes to the legislative organ (municipal assembly) the local budget 
and the plan of activities, whose approval does not require the agreement of a higher-
ranked authority. As part of the general government sector, local authorities are, 
however, subject to several control mechanisms by central government agencies. These 
control mechanisms limit their access to revenue and their expenditure choices.11  
Political business cycles are more likely to occur on items whose timing of 
implementation is controlled by the mayor and which are visible to the electorate. Local 
Portuguese politicians have more freedom to manipulate municipalities’ expenditures 
than revenues.12 Therefore, our analysis concentrates on the former and, in particular, on 
                                                 
7 The number of observations for studies intended to analyze the behavior of Portuguese central 
governments is small. Since the end of the dictatorship there were only 10 legislative elections 
in Portugal. Research on local governments provides many more degrees of freedom. 
8 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of local governments. 
9 Overseas municipalities, belonging to the islands of Madeira and Açores, are treated 
differently from those in the mainland. 
10 Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, Law 1/87, and currently Law 46/98. 
11 For a description of local public finances, rules and performance, in Portugal see Baleiras 
(1998). 
12 Transfers from the Central Administration and the E.U. represent a very important source of 
funding for municipalities. 
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capital expenditures. Current expenditure decisions are subject to greater rigidity. Items 
such as salaries don’t have enough flexibility to be changed before elections, since they 
are regulated by rigid labour contracts, both in terms of duration and wage rates. 
Capital expenditures in Portuguese municipalities include investment 
expenditures implemented by the municipality13 and capital transfers to the counties 
(“freguesias”). Investment expenditures are divided in four categories, some with sub-
components: (1) acquisition of land, (2) housing, (3) other buildings, and (4) diverse 
constructions. The “Other buildings” item includes: (3.1) sports, recreational and 
schooling infrastructures; (3.2) social equipment; and (3.3) other. The “Diverse 
constructions” category is composed of the following items: (4.1) overpasses, streets 
and complementary work; (4.2) sewage; (4.3) water treatment and distribution; (4.4) 
rural roads; (4.5) infrastructures for solid waste treatment; and (4.6) other. 
 
4. THE DATASET 
This paper investigates the capital expenditure accounts of all mainland 
Portuguese municipalities (278). The period under analysis goes from 1979 to 2000, 
covering six electoral terms.  
Data on the municipalities’ area and the local accounts was obtained from the 
Municipalities General Direction’s (“Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais”) annual 
publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances).  This journal exists from 
1978 to 1983 and from 1986 to 1999. For the two missing years, 1984 and 1985, data 
was obtained directly from the municipalities’ official accounts. Data collection is still 
under process. We currently have 126 observations for 1984 and 130 for 1985. 
Data on municipal area and population was acquired from the Marktest’s Sales 
Index dataset and consumer price indexes from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. Political data, namely election dates and municipal electoral results, were 
obtained from the National Electoral Commission (“Comissão Nacional de Eleições”) 
and from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process 
(“Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral”) of the Internal Affairs 
Ministry. 
 
                                                 
13 The delimitation of areas of public investment between the central and local administration 
was defined in decree-law 77/84 and law 159/99. 
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5. THE METHODOLOGY 
This paper attempts to determine the impact of political factors on Portuguese 
Municipal total capital expenditures and its components, namely whether there is 
evidence of political business cycles. It concentrates on the expenditure side since local 
governments have more freedom to manipulate expenditures than revenues.  
The empirical work starts by analysing total capital expenditures and total 
investment. For these two series the baseline model consists of the following 
specification: 
 
Expit = αi + β(L)Expit + χCap_Transfit + δPElectit + εMajorityit + φ(Maj*PElect)it + 
γ(ReCand*PElect)it  + eit             (1) 
 
Where the dependent variable, Expit, represents real per capita total capital 
expenditures or real per capita total investment. Both series are measured in real terms, 
to control for price increases over time, and they are defined in per capita terms in order 
to take into account size differences among municipalities. (L)Expit denote lags of the 
dependent variable.14   
To control for fixed differences in capital expenditures among municipalities, 
dummies for all municipalities except one were included in the model (αi).15 Real per 
capita capital transfers for each municipality (Cap_Transfit) is used as a control 
variable. Capital transfers include, among others, transfers from the Central 
Administration (namely through the Equilibrium Financial Fund) and from the 
European Union, such as the structural funds. They represent around 70% of total 
capital municipal revenues. Their evolution is, therefore, likely to limit the use of capital 
expenditures with electoral purposes. This variable is also used to control for changes in 
the macroeconomic situation of the country over time.  
In order to test if local incumbents behave opportunistically before elections by 
increasing capital expenditures, terms of office were divided into pre and post-electoral 
periods. Two pre-electoral periods (PElect) are considered alternatively: the election 
                                                 
14 The optimal number of lags was determined according to their statistical significance and the 
absence of auto-correlation. 
15 An F-test on the global significance of these variables allowed us to reject the hypothesis that 
they are globally not significant with a 1% significance level. A Hausman test performed to 
determine whether a random effects model would outperform the fixed effects model, suggested 
that the estimation of a fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
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year; and, the election year and the year before.16 Two dummy variables (Elect_Year 
and Year_Bef_El) were created corresponding to these specific years. A positive sign is 
expected for the estimated coefficients associated with them.  
If the mayor’s party has an overall majority in the municipal assembly, there is 
greater probability that the latter will approve a budget and a plan of activities that 
reflects her/his preferences. Therefore, the degree of political cohesion may influence 
the capacity to implement investment projects and the occurrence of political cycles. In 
order to test this hypothesis a dummy variable (Majority) was created, that takes the 
value of one when the local incumbent’s party has an overall majority in the municipal 
assembly, and zero otherwise. Interactions of this variable with those used to test 
opportunistic cycles (Maj*PElect) were also introduced in the model.  
Since politicians running for another term may have a stronger incentive to 
behave opportunistically before elections than those who are not, two dummy variables 
were created to identify the municipalities where the mayor is running again for office. 
ReCan*PElect assumes the value of one in the pre election period when the mayor is 
running for another term and zero otherwise.  
To refine the analysis, investment expenditures were disaggregated by 
components and model specifications were also reformulated. Because the 
characteristics of the municipalities, such as its population density (Pop_Densit) and the 
percentages of the population having less than 15 years (%PopUnder15it) or more than 
65 years (%PopOver65it), may influence local governments’ investment priorities, these 
control variables were added to the model described in equation (1).17 The population 
density was included to capture the municipalities’ degree of urbanization. Individuals 
under 15 years or over 65 years have specific needs regarding schooling, healthcare, 
elderly care, etc..18 The stronger these groups are the more pressure they are likely to 
exert on local governments to invest on items that fulfil their needs. 
                                                 
16 The election year is considered as pre-electoral since municipal elections always took place in 
December. In Portugal, municipal election dates are exogenously set. Until 1985 they took place 
every three years and since then they occur every four years. Municipal election dates were the 
following: December 12, 1976; December 16, 1979; December 12, 1982; December 15, 1985; 
December 17, 1989; December 12, 1993; December 14, 1997; and December 16, 2001. 
17 The inclusion of a variable measuring the wealth of the municipalities would be desirable. 
Unfortunately for a sample with this time dimension (1979-2000) such a variable has not yet 
been found. 
18 In Portugal municipalities are responsible among other thinks, for public kinder gardens, 
elementary schools, day centers for the elderly, home for the aged, and primary healthcare. 
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Taking into account Hibbs’ partisan theory according to which incumbents try to 
favour the groups of the population by which they were elected, one would expect the 
mayors’ ideology to condition the type of public investment they privilege. In particular, 
left-wing incumbents are expected to attribute higher priority to investments that benefit 
the lower classes of the population. Tests of partisan effects were performed in 
investment components by including as an independent variable a dummy (Right) that 
assumes the value of one when the municipality is governed by a right-wing incumbent 
and a value of zero otherwise.19 According to partisan theory, a negative sign is 
expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this variable when the dependent 
variable is an item of capital expenditures that contributes more for the well-being of the 
less favoured. In sum, the model used for each investment component was the 
following:20
 
Expit = αi + β(L)Expit + χCap_Transfit + δPop_Densit + ε%PopUnder15it + 
φ%PopOver65it + γPElectit + ηMajorityit + ι(Maj*PElect)it + 
ϕ(ReCand*PElect)it  + Rightit + eit                      (2) 
 
 To refine partisan theory tests, regressions were also run on a model using as 
dependent variable the weight of each investment component on total investment. 
Explanatory variables were the same as those considered in equation (2) with the 
exception of Cap_Transfit, Majorityit and Maj*PElectit and ReCand*PElectit that were 
excluded. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section starts by presenting some descriptive statistics of the main variables 
used in the empirical work (table 1). OLS estimations, controlling for fixed effects, of 
the models described above are then presented.  
 
                                                 
19 The Socialist Party (PS), the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), and the People’s 
Democratic Union (UDP) were considered as left, while the People’s Democratic Party / Social 
Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) and the Democratic and Social Center / People’s Party (CDS/PP) 
were classified as right. 
20 As before, they are all measured in real per capita terms. 
 9
Table 1. Data descriptive statistics 
  Variable type MeanUnits Max. value Min.value Stand. dev. N. obs. 
Real per capita total capital expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 36.03 287.96    1.89 24.47 5 749
Real per capita total investment expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 31.81 288.51    
    
   
       
        
        
       
1.78 22.51 5 743
Real per capita land acquisition expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 0.91 40.99 0 1.83 5 472 
Real per capita housing expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 1.88 100.97 0 4.64 5 473 
Real per capita other buildings expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 5.51 80.65 0 6.40 4 449 
Real per capita sports, recreational and 
schooling infrastructures expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 1.98 59.72 0 3.70 5 473 
Real per capita social equipment expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 0.31 41.75 0 1.37 5 468 
Real per capita other expenditures  Continuous  1 000 escudos 2.93 61.35 0 4.61 4 424 
Real per capita miscellaneous constructions 
expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 20.88 214.70 0 17.86 4 449 
Real per capita overpasses, streets and 
complementary works expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 4.41  84.22 0 5.82 5 470 
Real per capita sewage expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 2.38 69.09 0 3.89 4 450 
Real per capita water capitation, treatment 
and distribution expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 2.94 100.28 0 4.91 4 450 
Real per capita rural roads expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 5.91 152.86 0 8.79 5 474 
Real per capita infrastructures for solid waste
treatment expenditures 
Continuous 1 000 escudos 0.22 98.90 0 2.07 4 442 
Real per capita other expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 4.01 122.24 0 6.88 4 175 
Real per capita capital transfers expenditures Continuous 1 000 escudos 26.06 249.74 3.04 19.48 5 741
Population Density 
 
Continuous Inhabitants by Km2 278.64     
 
9 688.55 
 
6.72      
 
877.52 6 053 
Election Year Dummy  0.27 1 0 0.44 6 056
Election Year and Year Before 
 
Dummy  0.54 1 0 0.49 6 056 
Majority Dummy 0.58 1 0 0.49 6 049
Re-candidate_1 Dummy 0.20 1 0 0.40 5 789
Re-candidate_2
 
Dummy 0.42 1 0 0.49 5 631
Right Dummy 0.47 1 0 0.49 6 049
Legislative Election Year Dummy  0.36 1 0 0.48 6 056 
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We first tested the influence of political factors on real per capita total capital 
expenditures. Results, shown in table 2, clearly indicate that capital expenditures are 
positively affected by the amount of capital transfers received by the municipalities. 
 
Table 2. Tests on real per capita total capital expenditures  
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Exp(-1) .27    .27 .28          .28 .28 
 (27.04)*** (26.85)*** (27.78)*** (27.89)*** (28.12)*** 
      
Cap_Transf .86 .86 .86 .85 .85 
 (64.28)*** (64.36)*** (65.11)*** (65.12)*** (65.20)*** 
 
Elect_Year 
 
1.91 
 
2.56 
 
1.04    
 
1.94 
 
2.69 
 (2.10)** (2.77)*** (2.93)*** (5.14)*** (6.17)*** 
      
Year_Bef_El  1.04  2.45 3.34 
  (1.21)  (6.94)*** (7.63)*** 
      
Majority 1.62 1.27 1.50 1.55 1.51 
 (3.82)*** (2.55)** (3.89)*** (4.02)*** (3.92)*** 
      
Maj*Elect_Year -.69 -.31    
 (-.91) (-.40)    
 
Maj*Year_Bef_El 
 
 
 
.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1.08)    
      
ReCan*Elect_Year -.25 -.23    
 (-.29) (-.26)    
      
ReCan*Year_Bef_El  1.08    
  (1.37)    
      
Leg_Elect_Year     1.41 
     (3.42)*** 
      
      
Adjusted R2 .81 .81 .81 .81 .81 
N. observat. 5 193 5 087 5 298 5 298 5 298 
      
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
 
The estimation results presented in column 1 of table 2 reveal that total capital 
expenditures increase in election years, suggesting that Portuguese local governments 
behave opportunistically. The estimated coefficient associated with the dummy variable 
Majority shows that municipalities where the mayor’s party has an overall majority in 
the municipal assembly have greater capital expenditures than the others. However, the 
interaction of this variable with those used to capture the pre-electoral period 
(Maj*Elect_Year) indicate that political cohesion does not influence the dimension of 
the opportunistic cycle. Regarding the re-candidature effect (ReCan*Elect_Year), 
evidence does not support the hypothesis that incumbents who run for another term are 
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more prone to increase capital expenses, in order to appear more competent and win the 
election, than those who are not running again. A possible explanation for this result is 
that, even when incumbents are not running for re-election, they generate an 
opportunistic cycle in order to support their political party’s candidate, whose votes 
depend on their popularity.21  
Because some municipal investments may require more than one year to be 
accomplished, the dummy for the years immediately before elections (Year_Bef_El) 
was introduced in the specification (column 2).22 Although the estimated coefficient for 
this dummy is positive, as expected, it turned out not to be statistically significant.   
Regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 are similar to the previous ones except 
that they exclude the interaction variables that were not statistically significant in 
previous regressions (Maj*Elect_Year, Maj*Year_Bef_El, ReCan*Elect_Year and 
ReCand*Year_Bef_El). Results are basically the same, except that the dummy for the 
years immediately before elections is now highly statistically significant. 
Under the hypothesis that local politicians may have an interest in who wins the 
national elections, a dummy variable equal to one in years in which legislative elections 
occurred and zero otherwise (Leg_Elect_Year) was introduced in the model. Column 5 
presents the results for this specification. The positive and statically significant 
estimated coefficient associated with this variable reveals that, in fact, mayors increase 
capital expenditures in legislative election years. This suggests that local politicians also 
try to appear more competent before the electorate in legislative elections years in order 
to attract votes for the party they belong to.23
The paper now proceeds by estimating analogous regressions for real per capita 
total investment. As can be seen in Table 3 results are essentially the same. Local 
politicians increase investment expenditures before municipal elections, particularly in 
balloting years. Municipalities governed by mayors belonging to the party that 
dominates the municipal assembly spend more on investment items than more 
                                                 
21 To refine this result data on the number of consecutive mandates of each mayor is being 
collected. It is plausible that incumbents running for office for the third or more time do not 
need to woo the electorate before elections since their competence has already been revealed in 
previous mandates. 
22 Recall that until 1985 municipal elections took place every three years while after that they 
occurred every four years.  
23 The correlation between the legislative election years dummy and dummies for municipal 
election years is -.03, and with the preceding year is -.46. 
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politically fragmented municipalities. Finally, investment expenditures are higher in 
legislative election years. It should however be noted that in regression results presented 
in columns 2, 4 and 5 there is weak evidence that mayors who are running again for 
office increase investment expenditures in pre electoral periods more than those who are 
not re-running. This effect is nevertheless only visible in the years immediately before 
elections (ReCan*Year_Bef_Elect). 
 
Table 3. Tests on real per capita total investment expenditures 
 1 2 3 4 5 
        
Exp(-1)    .30 .30 .31 .30 .30 
 (26.43)*** (25.85)*** (26.80)*** (25.85)*** (26.03)*** 
        
Exp(-2) -.06 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.06 
 (-5.63)*** (-4.77)** (-4.95)*** (-4.77)*** (-5.21)*** 
        
Cap_Transf .77 .77 .77 .77 .77 
 (65.38)*** (65.20)*** (65.20)*** (65.24)*** (65.32)*** 
        
Elect_Year 2.01 2.91 2.41 2.96 3.62 
 (2.50)** (3.52)*** (7.34)*** (4.07)*** (4.77)*** 
        
Year_Bef_El  1.05 
  1.46  2.14 
 
 
(1.37) 
  (2.19)**  (3.04)*** 
        
Majority 1.37 1.02 1.28 1.26 1.27 
 (3.44)*** (2.13)** (3.47)*** (3.44)*** (3.46)*** 
        
Maj*Elect_Year -.29 -.65    
 (-.44) (-.83)    
        
Maj*Year_Bef_El  .73    
  (1.09)    
        
ReCand*Elect_Year .38 .41  .40 .30 
 (.50) (.53)  (.52) (.39) 
        
ReCan*Year_Bef_Elect  1.33  1.35 1.35 
  (1.90)*  (1.94)* (1.93)* 
        
Leg_Elect_Year     1.20 
     (3.04)*** 
        
        
Adjusted R2 .82 .83 .82 .83 .83 
N. observat. 4 754 4 648 4 858 4 648 4 648 
        
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
 
 
To refine the analysis the main components of investment (land acquisition, 
housing, other buildings, and miscellaneous constructions), as well as their sub-
categories, were also investigated. Three additional control variables (population 
density, percentage of the population under 15 years and percentage of the population 
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over 65 years) and the dummy for the mayors’ ideology (right=1) were added to the 
previous model (equation 2). Results also stress that the dimension of the opportunistic 
cycle does not depend on the existence of a majority in the municipal assembly of the 
mayor’s party, nor on the fact that the incumbent is running again for office. The 
variables used to test these hypotheses were therefore excluded from the regressions.  
As can be seen from table 4, capital transfers continues to be a highly significant 
variable explaining expenditures on investment components. The new control variables 
do not seem to exert a strong influence on the series, with the exception of the 
population density on “Housing”24 and the percentage of the population under 15 years 
old on “Land Acquisition”. Political factors have different impacts on these items. 
Opportunistic cycles are stronger on “Miscellaneous Construction” and “Other 
Building,” and are not visible on “Housing” expenditures. For the first two series, 
evidence further confirmed that opportunistic effects exist both in the election year and 
the preceding one, but they are stronger in the election year. There is strong evidence 
suggesting that municipalities’ political cohesion increases expenditures in “Other 
Buildings” and weak evidence pointing that the same effect occurs on “Housing” 
expenditures. Results suggest that the mayor’s ideology has no impact on expenditures 
decisions. On “Housing” expenditures the coefficient associated with the dummy for 
right-wing oriented incumbents turned out to be marginally statistically significant but 
with a sign that is contrary to our prior. Since the poorer are the main beneficiary of 
municipalities’ investments on housing, according to Hibbs’ partisan theory one would 
expect the estimated coefficient for this variable to be negatively signed. In legislative 
election years’ expenditures on “Land Acquisition” and “Other Buildings” tend to 
increase, but the same does not happen on the other two series considered. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The estimated coefficient for the population density is significant and negative for “Housing”. 
Taking into account that Lisbon and Porto are the two biggest cities in Portugal and have a 
population density much higher (8 019 and 7 202 inhabitants by Km2 respectively) than the rest 
of the country (224 inhabitants by Km2), tests were also performed on a sample excluding these 
two municipalities. Results did not change, except that for “Housing” the density of the 
population turned out to be statistically significant at the 1% significance level and positively 
signed.  
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Table 4. Tests on real per capita investment components   
 Investment Components 
 Land 
Acquisition 
Housing Other Buildings Miscellaneous 
constructions 
     
Exp(-1) .19 .42 .35 .28 
 (11.51)*** (25.50)*** (20.37)*** (19.92)*** 
     
Exp(-2)  -.12 -.08 -.06 
  (-7.10)*** (-4.53)*** (-4.81)*** 
     
Exp(-3)   -.05  
   (-3.17)***  
     
Cap_Transf .01 .02 .14 .61 
 (7.70)*** (5.47)*** (17.01)*** (47.35)*** 
 
Pop_Density 
 
-.0001 
 
-.003 
 
-.0007 
 
.0006 
 (-.43) (-3.83)*** (-.45) (.27) 
     
%PopUnder15 -.03 .01 .04 .05 
 (-2.65)** (.43) (.77) (.69) 
     
%PopOver65 .01 .07 -.02 -.24 
 (.50) (.1.52) (-.29) (-1.93)* 
     
Elect_Year .03 .08 1.21 2.34 
 (.47) (.52) (4.61)*** (5.85)*** 
 
Year_Bef_El 
 
.25 
 
.05 
 
.59 
 
1.60 
 (3.45)*** (.36) (2.31)** (4.23)*** 
     
Majority .11 .26 .85 .11 
 (1.67) (1.69)* (3.37)*** (.32) 
     
Right -.03 .36 -.06 .03 
 (-.35) (1.81)* (-.21) (.06) 
     
Leg_El_Year .31 .006 .60 -.18 
 (4.68)*** (.04) (2.34)** (-.46) 
     
     
Adjusted R2 .17 .32 .38 .80 
N. observations 4 805 4 230 3 530 3 807 
     
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects. 
 
 
Because expenditures on “Other Buildings” and “Miscellaneous constructions” 
are disaggregated in several items we then refined even further the analysis.25 Table 5 
shows estimation results for the sub-categories of these two series where stronger 
evidence supporting political business cycles was found. All estimation results 
                                                 
25 Recall that “Other Buildings” is composed of the following items: “Sports, recreational and 
schooling infrastructures”; “Social equipment”; and “Other”. “Miscellaneous Constructions” 
includes: “Overpasses, streets and complementary work”; “Sewage”; “Water captation, 
treatment and distribution”; “Rural roads”; “Infrastructures for solid waste treatment”; and 
“Other”. 
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presented support the hypothesis that incumbents increase expenditures in pre-electoral 
periods. Furthermore, evidence for this phenomenon is higher in expenditures on water 
captation, distribution and treatment, and particularly on streets/roads and 
complementary works.  Taking into account that incumbents are trying to woo the 
electorate before elections, it is not surprising that they choose to manipulate items that 
are highly visible to the population.  
 
Table 5. Tests on Other Buildings and Miscellaneous Constructions components 
 Other 
Buildings 
Miscellaneous Constructions 
 Other  Overpasses, 
streets & 
compl. work
Sewage Water 
captation, 
treatment 
and 
distribution 
Rural roads Other 
        
Exp(-1) .30  .36 .54 .39 .34 .33 
 (17.50)***  (25.95)*** (28.73)*** (21.99)*** (22.63)*** (18.69)*** 
        
Exp(-2) -.04   -.07 -.06 -.07 -.11 
 (-2.34)***   (-3.57)*** (-3.37)*** (-4.94)*** (-6.42)*** 
        
Exp(-3)     -.07   
     (-3.82)***   
 
Cap_Transf 
 
.06 
 
 
 
.07 
 
.04 
 
.08 
 
.20 
 
.12 
 (10.93)***  (12.16)*** (9.41)*** (14.01)*** (24.60)*** (14.10)*** 
        
Pop_Density -.0002  -.001 -.0001 -.00005 .0004 .0009 
 (-.25)  (-1.39) (-.16) (-.04) (.30) (.49) 
        
%PopUnder15 .02  -.08 .09 .10 .04 -.07 
 (.56)  (-2.45)** (3.18)*** (2.63)*** (.95) (-1.30) 
        
%PopOver65 .06  .12 .09 -.23 -.42 .14 
 
 
(1.11)  (2.32)** (2.24)** (-3.90)*** (-5.08)*** (1.61) 
       
Elect_Year .80  .79 .06 .26 .80 1.31 
 (4.17)***  (4.11)*** (.48) (1.37) (3.16)*** (4.81)*** 
        
Year_Bef_El .57  .62 .22 .49 .16 .84 
 (3.20)***  (3.23)*** (1.70)* (2.64)*** (.66) (2.97)*** 
        
Majority .39  .09 -.20 .01 .23 .09 
 (2.21)**  (.53) (-1.59) (.09) (.95) (.35) 
        
Right .20  -.02 .10 .46 -.82 .04 
 (.88)  (-.09) (.64) (1.98)** (-2.62)*** (.12) 
 
Leg_El_Year 
 
-.02 
 
 
 
.29 
 
.34 
 
.49 
 
-.15 
 
-.34 
 (-.11)  (.1.66)* (2.54)** (2.66)*** (-.62) (-1.24) 
        
        
Adjusted R2 .29  .43 .48 .44 .58 .43 
N. observat. 3 802  4 801 3 807 3 530 4 223 3 290 
        
Notes:  - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and * 10%. 
- Models estimated by OLS, controlling for fixed effects.  
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It is also important to mention that, with the exception “Water captation, 
treatment and distribution” and “Rural roads”, none of the regressions ran on investment 
components revealed the existence of partisan effects on local governments’ decisions. 
In order to confirm the robustness of this conclusion, tests were also performed on the 
weight of each type of municipal investment on total municipal investment. Once again, 
with the exception of the two series mentioned above, the dummy introduced to capture 
incumbents’ ideology did not turn out as statistically significant. Since investments on 
water captation, treatment and distribution or on rural roads benefit the generality of the 
population the statistically significant coefficient associated with them does not provide 
support for Hibbs’ partisan theory. Contrary to Hibbs’ predictions, we can conclude that 
left-wing oriented incumbents do not seem to invest relatively more on items that favour 
the lower classes of the population such as housing or social equipment.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the impact of political factors on Portuguese 
municipalities’ capital expenditures. It tries to determine whether there is evidence of 
political business cycles and if political cohesion in local governments influences the 
amount of capital expenditures implemented in the municipalities. The dataset 
constructed has information for all mainland municipalities in Portugal over a twenty 
two year period, from 1979 to 2000.  
 Results obtained clearly show that capital expenditures are higher in the second 
half of the mandates, particularly in election years. The increase of capital expenditures 
before elections reflects the incumbents’ opportunistic behaviour, since this may result 
from an attempt to appear more competent, increase popularity, and win the election. 
An investigation of the municipalities’ investment components revealed that it is mainly 
on items highly visible by the electorate, such as roads/streets and complementary 
works that political cycles occur. The increase in capital expenditures occurs not only 
before municipal elections but also in legislative balloting years suggesting that local 
politicians try to attract votes for the party they belong to. 
According to our prior there is evidence that capital expenditures are higher in 
municipalities where the mayor belongs to the party that dominates the municipal 
assembly. However, and contrary to our predictions, the data revealed that the size of 
the political business cycles is not influenced by local governments’ political cohesion. 
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It was also possible to conclude that incumbents running for another term do not behave 
more opportunistically the others. A possible explanation is that even when not running 
again for office, incumbents support their party’s candidate, whose likelihood of 
winning the election also depends on their party’s perceived competence. 
Regarding ideological considerations, we found no evidence of partisan effects. 
Tests were performed on investment components series, as well as on the weight of 
each investment category on total investment. No substantial evidence was found 
suggesting that left-wing incumbents spend relatively more on investment items that 
favour the poorer groups of the population.  
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